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POSITIVE PARENTING AND NEGATIVE
CONTRIBUTIONS: WHY PAYMENT OF CHILD
SUPPORT SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS
DISSIPATION OF MARITAL ASSETS
LAURA W. MORGAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, it was projected that the rate of divorce for couples married in the 1980s
and 1990s would be 50%.' In a triumph of hope over experience, most divorced
persons go on to marry again. 2 As a result of divorce and remarriage, the 1990
census revealed a portrait of families that is anything but "traditional."
Approximately 5.5 million married-couple households contain at least one stepchild under the age of 18. This constitutes 29% of all married-couple households
with children. Further, stepchildren make up 20% of all children in married-couple
families. 3
The 1996 Current Population Survey, released April 23, 1999, also revealed that
in the spring of 1996, 13.7 million custodial parents lived with 22.8 million children
under the age of 21; 11.6 million, or 85%, of custodial parents were women, while
2.1 million, or 15%, were men.4 Detailed information was also available regarding

* Laura W. Morgan is a Senior Attorney for Family Law at the National Legal Research Group in
Charlottesville, Virginia, and the author of CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES: INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION

(Aspen Law & Business 1996 & Supps. 1997-1999). She is currently Chair of the Child Support Committee of
the American Bar Association Section of Family Law.
1. For divorce rates of the 1960s through the 1990s, see Thomas M. Hanson, Intestate Successionfor
Stepchildren: CaliforniaLeads the Way, But Has It Gone FarEnough?, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 257, 259 (1995). One
commentator has been even more pessimistic. In Paul J. Buser's, The First Generationof Stepchildren, 25 FAM.
is predicted that within the next three decades, approximately twoL.Q. 1, 2 (1991), the author stated that, "[i]t
thirds of all marriages will end in divorce."
2. An estimated 75% of divorced persons remarry and go on to have additional children. See Marianne
Takas, Improving Child Support Guidelines, 26 FAM. L.Q. 171 (1992) (citing Arland Thornton & Deborah
Freedman, The Changing American Family, 38 POPULATION BULL. (1983)). Remarried couples, defined as "a
husband and wife maintaining a household with or without children in the home and with one or both spouses in
their second or subsequent marriage," represent 21.3%, or 11 million, of all married couples in the United States.
Paul C. Glick, RemarriedFamilies, Stepfamilies, and Stepchildren: A BriefDemographicProfile, 38 FAM. REL.
24 (1989); see also Mark A. Fine, Perceptions of Stepparents: Variation in Stereotypes as a Function of Current
Family Structure, 48 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 537 (1986). While judicial recognition of these facts has been slow, it
has not been absent. As stated recently stated in Smithson v. Eatherly, No. OIAOI-9806-CV-00314 (Tenn. Ct.App.
July 29, 1999) (unpublished):
Common experience teaches that many divorced persons in contemporary society will decide
to marry again and to start a new family. This understanding is borne out by statistics showing
that an estimated seventy-five percent of divorced persons marry again and that many of these
persons expect to begin a new family either with biological children, step-children, or both.
Multiple families or serial family development are now the norm rather than the exception.
(Citations omitted.)
3. See Paul J.Buser, The FirstGeneration of Stepchildren, 25 FAM. L.Q. 1, 2 (1991). It is worth noting
at this point that the Census Bureau defines "stepparent" as the relationship formed whenever an individual marries
the custodial parent of a minor child and thereafter resides with the child. This definition is utilized in many state
statutes that impose upon stepparents the duty to support a stepchild. See part [] infra (regarding the stepparent's
obligation of support). This definition of stepparent does not include the situation where a person, typically a
woman, marries a noncustodial parent, typically the father. See Marilyn lhinger-Tallman, Researchon Stepfamilies,
14 ANN. REV. Soc. 25, 28 (1988) (utilizing Census Bureau definition of stepparent, 82% of stepparents are
stepfathers while 18 percent of stepparents are stepmothers).
4. See Current Population Reports, Series P60-196, Child Support ForCustodial Mothers and Fathers:

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

the income, race, gender, and marital status of custodial parents, including what
types of custodial parents are more likely to receive full or partial payment of child
support as opposed to no child support.5
Detailed information of this nature regarding noncustodial parents has been more
elusive.6 Instead, the analyses have focused on the interrelationship of child support
and increased involvement with children, such as extended visitation, shared
custody, and other forms of parental involvement.7
Given the rates of out-of-wedlock births and remarriage, however, there can be
little doubt that a substantial number of noncustodial parents paying child support
marry persons other than the other parent of the child for whom they owe support.8
The 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participation study found nonresident
fathers remarried at a rate of 41%, while the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth, conducted from 1979 to 1992, found that nonresident fathers remarried at
a rate of 46% Consequently, the question of how equitable distribution laws
consider the obligation to support a child born outside of the marital relationship at
issue should be of real concern to the courts and to policy makers as the divorce and
remarriage rates continue to rise.
This article will discuss how the law of child support favors the timely payment
of child support to children born of a prior marriage or prior relationship when
considering the child support obligation for children born of the marriage. The
article will next survey the law concerning the duty of a stepparent to support a
stepchild, and will conclude that public policy clearly favors the support of a priorborn natural child to that of a stepchild. Third, this article will discuss how the law
of equitable distribution of marital property reverses this public policy, by favoring
the parent who supports the stepchild over the parent who supports his or her own
child from a previous relationship. Finally, this article will offer a solution to this
obvious contradiction in divorce law, by suggesting that the law of equitable
distribution should change to conform to child support law by viewing the income

1995 (1999) <httpJ/www.census.gov:80ihhes/www/chldsupt.hml>; Current Population Reports, Series P60-187,
Child Supportfor CustodialMothers and Fathers: 1991 (1995) <httpJ/www.census.gov/prod/21popJ p6 0/p 6O187.pdf>.
5. See Bureau of the Census, Who Receives Child Support? <httpJ/www.census.gov:80/apsd/www/
statbrief/sb95_16.pdf>; see also J. Peterson & C. Nord, The Regular Receipt of Child Support: A Multi-Step
Process, 40 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1 (1990), Sanford L. Braver et al., Noncustodial Parent'sReport on Child
Support Payments, 40 FAM. REL. 180 (1991).
6. The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), Bureau of the Census, asked men about the
support of children not living with them, but did not break down the information by current marital status. See
Suzanne M. Bianchi, Marital Separationand the Economic Well-Being of Childrenand Their Absent Fathers,
(1995) <httpJ/www.census.gov:80/dusdMAB/156pd- l.html>.
7. See Chuck Shively, Examining the Link Between Access to Children and Payment of Support, 11
DivORCE LinG. 85 (May 1999).
8. The most detailed information concerning the effects of remarriage on child support enforcement is
contained in David E. Bloom et al., Child Support and Fathers' Remarriage and Fertility,in FATHERS UNDER
FIRE: THE REVOLUTION INCHIUD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 128-156 (Irwin Garfinkel et al., eds., 1999). See also
Elaine Sorensen, A National Profile of Nonresident Fathers and Their Ability to Pay Child Support, 59 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 785 (1997).
9. See Bloom, supra, note 7, at 149. Another author notes that there are eleven million families in which
at least one spouse has been married before, and several million more in which at least one spouse has had an outof-wedlock child prior to marriage. See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Consent to Adoption, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND
PRACTICE 2-93 (Joan Heifetz Hollinger ed. 1990). "
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that is used to support prior-born children as income that is simply outside the
marital estate.
II. THE ABSOLUTE DUTY TO SUPPORT PRIOR-BORN CHILDREN
DURING A SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE
When a husband and wife divorce and one of the parties has a child support
obligation for a child born prior to a child born of the marriage, the child support
obligation to the prior born child is given absolute preference to the child support
obligation of the children born of the marriage through the mechanics of the child
support guidelines.1 ° The courts have consistently held that this legislative policy
choice of favoring preexisting child support orders is acceptable, and even
preferable to favoring later-born children. When a parent cannot afford to support
prior children and later children at the same standard of living, and someone has to
bear the cost of that choice, the cost should be borne by the later children for the
simple reason that the parent had the choice of whether to have additional children.
The 11
family "first in time" is entitled to have its support obligations considered
first.
The states, through the child support guidelines, have implemented this policy
choice of favoring preexisting children by allowing the obligor parent a credit for
child support actually paid under a court order. The only variation among the states'
guidelines is in determining where that credit comes into play in the calculation. In
the vast majority of states, the guidelines provide that an existing child support
obligation, arising out of a court order or separation agreement and actually paid,
is deducted from that parent's gross income. 2 Where this method is used, it is error
as a matter of law not to make the appropriate deduction. 3 Some of these same
10. One commentator has suggested that this approach is "both fair and obvious, given that the obligee of
the first order is generally not a party to the action then before the court; accordingly, the original order or
agreement is not then subject to modification." Susan Paikin, Trial of Child Support Issues, in FAMILY LAW
LITIGATION GUIDE wrrH FORMS: DISCOVERY, EVIDENCE, TRIAL PRACriCE § 34.04[4][h], at 34-71 (1993).
11. See In re Marriage of Zukausky, 613 N.E.2d 394 (111.Ct. App. 1993); Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 574
A.2d 772 (Vt. 1990).
12. See ALA. R. JUD. ADMIN. 32 (B)(6); ALASKA R. CIv. P. 90.3(a)(B, C); ARIZ. C.S.G., Appx. § 25-320
5 (1996); ARK. SUP. Cr. ADMIN. ORDER No. 10 (1998); CAL. FAM. CODE § 4059 (Supp. 1999); COLO.REV.
STAT. § 14-10-115 (d.5) (1998); Conn. C.S. and Arrearage G., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-215a-1(1)(F) (1999); DEL.
CHLD SUPPORT FORMULA, Clv. R. 52; D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-916.1(b)(5) (1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.30(3)(f)
(Supp. 1999); IDAHO R. Crv. P. 6(cX6) Section 7; 750 I.LC.S. 5/505(aX3)(g) (Supp. 1998); IND. C.S.G., Guideline
3(C) (1999); KAN. SuP. CT. ADMIN. ORDER NO. 107 (1998); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.212(2)(g)(2) (1998); A.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:315(1) (Supp. 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 2001 (1998); MD. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 12-201(dX1) (1997 & Supp. 1998); MASS. C.S.G., Sec. 11(1)(1999); Mich. Child Support Formula Manual II(L)
(1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.551(5)(b) (Supp. 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-19-101(3)(c) (Supp. 1997); MO.
Sup. Cr. R. 88.01 (1998); MoNT.ADMIN. R. 46.30.1531(1)(a)(i) (1998); NEB. C.S.G., Guideline E(6) (1998); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 458-C:2(1)(a) (1998); NJ. Rules, Appx. IX-A (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-11.1(C)(2)(d),
(e) (1995); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW. § 240(1-b)(b)(5)(vii)(D) (Supp. 1999); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-02-04.06 (1995);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. 3113.21.5(B)(5)(b) (Supp. 1998); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 118(13)(5) (Supp. 1999); OR.
ADMIN. 137-50-380 (1998); R.I. FAM. Cr. ADMIN. ORDER No. 87-2, See. IV(BX2Xa) (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 25-7-6.7(6) (Supp. 1997); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1240-2-4-.03(4) (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.5
(1997); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 653(1)(A) (1997); WIS. ADMIN. CODE § 80.04(1) (1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 206-301(a)(ii) (1997).
13. See Stewart v. Winfrey, 824 S.W.2d 374 (Ark. 1992); In re Marriage of Eze, 856 P.2d 75 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1993); In re Marriage of Ansay, 839 P.2d 527 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Sierra v. Ellison, 677 So. 2d 406 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Green v. Green, 672 So. 2d 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); In re Stanley, 666 N.E.2d 340 (1.
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states also provide that support for preexisting children, not made pursuant to a
court order, may be deducted from income as well.' 4 This provision benefits the
parent who has children from a prior relationship living with him or her.'" In a
minority of states, the support obligations to prior children, under court order or not,
are a deviation factor once the presumptive award is set. 6 Because a child support
award under the child support guidelines is income determinative, it is obvious that
in the majority of states, the support of prior born children is favored over the
support of later born children of a different relationship.
This absolute preference for the support of children born prior to the children of
the marriage has prompted at least a few litigants to play with the timing of various
support orders. In Marksberryv. Riley, 7 on day one, a father willingly entered into
a generous support order for the child of his first marriage. On day two, the father
was before the court on his second wife's request for modification of support. The
second wife had filed her request for modification well before the first wife filed
her request for support. Because the first wife obtained her order first, however, the
father was able to claim as a deduction the court-ordered support for that child. The
court noted that the timing and amount the obligor agreed to pay for the first child
opened the door for the possibility of favoritism and reprisals, but the trial court
correctly determined the father's support of the second child by taking into account
the court-ordered obligation for the first child. 8
The absolute preference for a child born prior to the children born of the
marriage when a child support obligation is being determined should be contrasted
with the consideration given to a child born after the children born of the marriage.
Unlike the near uniformity of approach concerning prior born children, states differ
on the fundamental public policy question of whether a parent should be prevented
from taking on additional child support responsibilities to the possible detriment of

App. Ct. 1996); Stowe v. Stowe, 617 So. 2d 161 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Commissioner of Social Services on behalf
of Selena S. v. Conrad R.W., 635 N.Y.S.2d 653 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Snyder v. Snyder, 663 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio.
Ct. App. 1995); Escue v. Escue, 810 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (payment made pursuant to court order must

be deducted from income).
14. These states include Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon.
See Scruggs v. Chandlee, 894 P.2d 239 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995).

15. Because so many more states grant a credit for support of prior children made pursuant to a court order
than also grant a credit for support of prior children not made pursuant to a court order, the guidelines clearly
discriminate against a custodial parent of prior children, as opposed to the noncustodial parent of prior children.
An argument may be made, however, that if the prior order arises under the guidelines, the custodial parent has,
in fact, been "ordered" to pay for support, because all guidelines assume that the custodial parent is paying a certain

percentage of income toward the support of the child. The custodial parent should, therefore, also be able to deduct
from income support for prior children. If a court does not accept this argument, the custodial parent may seek a
deviation based on the support of prior children. See Hutslar v. Lappin, 652 So. 2d 432, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1995) (court may deviate to take into account custodial parent's support of other children from prior relationship);
see also In re Marriage of Gulsvig, 498 N.W.2d 725, 726 (Iowa 1993) (support of prior children not made pursuant

to court order may be reason for deviation).
16.

E.g., Texas, Virginia.

17. 889 S.W.2d 47, (Ky. Ct. App. 1994).
18.

See also In re Marriage of Potts, 696 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) ("prior order" means first

family, even though order for second family was entered on court docket first); Spencer ex reL Spencer v. White,
584 N.W.2d 572, 574 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) ("Qualified Additional Dependent Deduction," rather than prior child
support order deduction, was appropriate for child born later, but whose support was ordered earlier).
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children already in need of support,19 or whether all children should be treated
equally regardless of the parent's behavior.2' Indeed, South Carolina stated the
problem succinctly in the guidelines themselves:
A frequent factor in the determination of a child support award is the existence
of additional dependents. The court is often faced with the task of balancing the
needs of the noncustodial parent's additional dependents with those of the
children in the action before the court, while also trying to encourage parental
responsibility.2
Another reason the states are not uniform in their treatment of subsequent
children is that unlike child support obligations that have been previously imposed
by a court, child support obligations for subsequent children are generally not courtordered, the exception being out-of-wedlock paternity judgments, and thus there has
been no judicial scrutiny as to either their reasonableness or their necessity. As
stated by one court, the mere fact that a parent may have a legal duty to support
other children does not indicate the extent of the support needs of the other children,
whether those needs are or can be met by other persons, or the obligor's actual
contribution to those needs.22
Because of the lack of unanimity in underlying public policy and the difficulty
in assessing subsequent children's needs, the states have taken varying approaches
to the consideration of subsequent children. First, some guidelines provide that the
court must deduct support for subsequent children from gross income. Second, some
guidelines provide that the court may deduct support for subsequent children from
gross income if the circumstances so warrant. This is very much like treating
subsequent children as a deviation factor, except the discretion of the court comes
into play earlier in the guideline calculation. Third, some guidelines provide that the
court may deviate from the presumptive award if the circumstances so warrant.
Fourth, some states make no provision, even by way of deviation, for subsequent
children.2 3
Regardless of the method chosen, many states further provide that the
consideration of subsequent children may only be used "defensively" and not
"offensively." This means that an obligor may not affirmatively seek a modification
of the support obligation on the grounds that he or she has new children from a
subsequent marriage. The obligor may, however, defend a motion for an upward
modification of the support obligation on the grounds that he or she has new
children from a subsequent marriage.' The public policy reason for this restriction

19. See, e.g., Feltman v. Feltman, 434 N.W.2d 590, 593 (S.D. 1989) (noncustodial parent who becomes
responsible for supporting the children of a second marriage does so with the knowledge of a continuing
responsibility to the children of the first marriage). This policy is also expressed in the imputation of income to
parents who stay at home to care for children of a subsequent marriage.
20. See, e.g., PA. R. CIV. P. 1910.1605(n) (the goal of the guidelines is to treat every child equitably).
21. S.C. Soc. SERV. REG. 114-4720() (Supp. 1998).
22. Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 574 A.2d 772,777 (Vt. 1990) (citing In re C.D., 767 P.2d 809, 811-12 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1988)).
23. See LAURA W. MORGAN, CHD SUPPORT GUIDENEs: INrTEPRETATION AND APPLICATION § 3.04(bX1),
tbl. 3-6, at 3-46 (Supp. 1999).
24. Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, specifically state that support of subsequent children may
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is that parents should plan for additional children through increased earnings and
not through a reduction in support of existing children.
Where a child support guideline provides that subsequent children are a possible
deduction from income or are a deviation factor, the guideline is essentially
embodying the public policy of "first family first." Under this method, the needs of
the children of the first family have primacy.25 A deviation may be had only where
the parent demonstrates that the second family has a significant impact on his or her
ability to support the children of the prior marriage.26
By contrast, where a court considers the needs of a subsequent family as a
mandatory deduction from income, the guideline is embodying the public policy of
"second family first." This approach has been criticized as validating
"irresponsible" behavior, because it allows a parent to have additional children to
the detriment of prior children. 7 This criticism seems unwarranted, as even in
mandatory deduction states such as Colorado, Iowa, Missouri, North Carolina, and

only be used defensively. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ansay, 839 P.2d 527 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Clowdis v.
Earnest, 629 So. 2d 1044, 1045 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1993) (court may consider the needs of a new child in defense
to a motion for upward modification); Matter of Marriage of Johnson, 950 P.2d 267, 272 (Kan. Ct. App. 1997);
Bock v. Bock, 506 N.W.2d 321, 323 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (it was appropriate for court to consider support for
subsequent children as a defensive deviation in response to obligee's request for upward modification); Samples
v. Kouts, 954 S.W.2d 593, 598 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); In re Marriage of Bloor, 926 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Mo. Ct. App.
1996) (where father cross-petitioned for modification, he became moving party and thus could not claim deduction
for subsequent children); Farish v. Farish, 921 S.W.2d 538, 545 (Tex. CL App. 1996) (new child does not constitute
material and substantial change to warrant modification); Brinkerhoff v. Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d 113, 118 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997).
25.

See HARRY KRAUSF, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 20 (1981) Traditionally,

courts have taken the position that the father's prior support obligations take absolute precedence over the needs
of the new family, and rejected the plea that a new family constitutes a change in circumstance justifying
modification. See id.
26. See Ailsup v. State ex rel. Salas, 648 So. 2d 597, 599 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (while support of new child
can be deviation factor, court must be presented with evidence of new child's expenses, other means of support,
etc.); Howard v. Wiseman, 826 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Ark. Ct. App. 1992) (adjusting of child support guideline
permitted amount may be adjusted to take into consideration obligations to a current family where strict application
of the guidelines would result in hardship to the current family); Haggard v. Haggard, 45 Cal. Rptr.2d 638, 639
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (disallowing remarriage and support of new spouse and child as special circumstance for
deviation below guidelines); State Dep't of Revenue ex rel. Powell v. Feeney, 689 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1997); State ex rel. Nielsen v. Nielsen, 521 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 1994) (guidelines permit consideration of
subsequent children as deviation factor, but do not require it); Guillot v. Munn, 676 So. 2d 86 (La. 1996) (deviation
from child support guidelines not warranted for subsequent child absent evidence of expenses or extent to which
new spouse contributes to support); In re Marriage of Cohen, 884 S.W.2d 35, 38 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (new child
is a factor to consider, but it does not require deviation); Lodden v. Lodden, 497 N.W.2d 59, 62-63 (Neb. 1993)
(holding that the mere fact that a former husband contributed to support of subsequently adopted son does not
warrant deviation, absent sufficient evidence to rebut presumption established by guideline); Scott v. Scott, 822
P.2d 654, 656 (Nev. 1991) (holding that a court may deviate for support given to subsequent children as it impacts
on ability to provide support); Palmieri v. LaConti, 662 N.Y.S.2d 78,79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (discussing policy
considerations when determining whether to deviate because of other children of noncustodial parent); White v.
Cook, 440 S.E.2d 391, 393 (S.C. 1994) (court should consider obligation to subsequent children); Jensen v.
Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053, 1057-58 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (holding that guidelines do not mandate that a credit be
given for children in father's home, but court may consider support to such children in its discretion); Ainsworth
v. Ainsworth, 574 A.2d 772, 777-78 (Vt. 1990) (upholding deviation for stepchild of second marriage); Hasty v.
Hasty, 828 P.2d 94, 99 (Wyo. 1992) (obligating consideration of subsequent children as a reason for deviation);
see also Miller v. Tashie, 454 S.E.2d 498, 449 (Ga. 1995) (holding that increased responsibility for new child
constitutes substantial change in circumstances); Graham v. Adams, 608 N.E.2d 614, 617 (111.Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that court can consider mother's obligation to support children not of the obligor in setting obligor's
support).
27. See Paikin, supra note 10, at 34-72.
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Vermont, the existence of subsequent children cannot be used offensively. New
children are, thus, not used as an excuse to avoid a preexisting obligation, but may
only be used as a defense to a request for upward modification of an existing
support order for prior born children. Moreover, where the court considers the needs
of subsequent children, the court will also consider the income provided by the
subsequent children's other parent. 8 The threat of irresponsible behavior is,
therefore, mitigated by the consideration of all possible sources of support for the
new child. 9
In sum, when a husband and wife divorce and the court is required to consider
the child support obligations of either parent to a child not born of the marriage
when determining the appropriate child support obligation of the parents for the
children born of the marriage, the child support guidelines and the case law clearly
favor the fulfillment of child support obligations of prior born children under an
articulated public policy of first children first. By contrast, the support of children
born after children born of the marriage is usually treated as a deviation factor only,
with the parent left to prove the financial impact of such support.
III. THE EVANESCENT DUTY TO SUPPORT STEPCHILDREN
DURING A SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE
Unlike the absolute duty to support a natural child born prior to a subsequent
marriage, the duty to support a stepchild is, at best, ephemeral. Under the common
law, a stepparent has no duty to financially support a stepchild during the marriage
to the child's natural parent merely by reason of the marriage. Stated otherwise, the
relationship of stepparent and stepchild does not, in and of itself, impose any
obligation of support.30

28. See, e.g., Bock v. Bock, 506 N.W.2d 321, 325 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
29. One prominent commentator also criticized the use of a credit for other children for a number of reasons.
See Marianne Takas, Addressing Subsequent Families in Child Support Guidelines, in CHULD SUPPORT
GUIDELJNEs: THE NEXT GENERATION (Margaret Campbell Haynes ed., 1994).
First, the credit for subsequent children is usually inapplicable to subsequent family development of the
custodial parent. Most states consider only the subsequent children of the obligor in deciding whether to apply a
credit to income or to deviate from the guidelines. Compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 16.916.1()(4) (1997); MISS. CODE
ANN. § 43-19-101(3)(d) (1993); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1-b)(f) (Supp. 1999); N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 75-0204.1-06 (1995); S.C. Soc. SERV. REG. 114-4720(7) (Supp. 1998) (considering obligor parent's obligation to
support subsequent children), with MD. FAM. CODE ANN. § 12-202(a)(2XiiiX2) (Supp. 1999); OR. ADMIN. 137-50390 (considering either parent's subsequent children). This criticism also holds true for support of prior children:
the deduction from income is given more often to a support obligor who pays pursuant to a court order. See, e.g.,
In re Marriage of Starke, 939 P.2d 46 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (custodial mother entitled to credit for subsequent child
of new marriage).
Second, it may allocate more support to subsequent children than to the children in the case at bar,
because the credit allocates support for subsequent children from the noncustodial parent's full income base,
leaving a reduced income pot for the children in the case at bar. Indeed, this precise criticism was stated in Hayes
v. Hayes, 473 N.W.2d 364, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), where the court held that the subtraction method gives
excessive deference to the later born child, and that deviation is the only appropriate method of factoring in a
subsequent child.
Third, a credit for subsequent children assumes that subsequent children impose a hardship and gives
relief on this basis. This may not be the case. Studies have shown that subsequent children work a hardship for the
noncustodial parent only where the noncustodial parent's new spouse is unemployed. Where the new spouse is fully
employed, diminution in standard of living is minimal. See Takas, supra
30. -See Grubb v. Sterrett, 315 F. Supp. 990,993 (N.D. Ind.). aftd, 400 U.S. 922 (1970); In re Marriage
of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 330 (Cal. 1976); Zeller v. Zeller, 407 P.2d 478, 480 (Kan. 1965); Brummit v. Kentucky,
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In the absence of a contract, a stepparent is obligated to support a stepchild
during the marriage in two circumstances: (1) there is a statute imposing such a
duty,31 or (2) the stepparent undertakes to act in loco parentisto the child. These
statutes have withstood a variety of attacks, constitutional and otherwise.32 Most
significantly, however, these statutes do no more than codify the in loco parentis
doctrine.
The in loco parentisdoctrine states that if a stepparent takes stepchildren into his
or her family or under his or her care in such a way that he or she places himself or
herself in loco parentis,then the stepparent assumes an obligation to support the
stepchildren.33 Stated succinctly,
The universal rule is that a stepfather, as such, is not under obligation to support
the stepchildren, but that, if he takes the children into his family or under his
care in such a way that he places himself in loco parentis, he assumes an
obligation to support them, and acquires a correlative right to their services. 4
357 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Ky. 1962); Youmans v. Citizens Insurance Co. of America, 280 N.W.2d 539, 542 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1979); Meagher v. Hennepin County Welfare Board, 221 N.W.2d 140, 144-45 (Minn. 1974); Hawkins v.
Thompson, 210 S.W.2d 747, 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 1948); Green v. Department of Institutions and Agencies, 263
A.2d 796, 799 (N.J. App. Div. 1970); Kaiser v. Kaiser, 402 N.Y.S.2d 171, 172 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978); State v.
White, 189 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962); Commonwealth ex rel. Stack v. Stack, 15 A.2d 76, 79 (Pa.
Super. 1940); Niesen v. Niesen, 157 N.W.2d 660,664 (Wis. 1968). See generally Margaret M. Mahoney, Support
and Custody Aspects of the Stepparent-ChildRelationship, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 38 (1984).
31. Nineteen states have statutes imposing a duty on stepparents to support their stepchildren: DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 501(b) (1993) (stepparent liable for support of stepchild during marriage); HAW. REV. STAT. § 577-4
(1999) (stepparent liable for support of stepchild during marriage); IOWA CODE ANN. § 252A.2(3) (Supp. 1999)
(including stepchild in definition of children to whom a duty of support is owed); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.310
(1998) (stepparent has duty to support stepchild during marriage); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 568.040 (1999) (criminal
nonsupport statute applies equally to parents and stepparents); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-217 (1999) (if stepparent
receives stepchild into family and supports him or her, stepparent is presumed to do so as a parent); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 28-706 (1995) (criminal nonsupport statute applies to stepparents); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 62.044 (1996)
(stepparent liable to same extent as parent for neglect and dependency ofchild); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 546-A: 1,
A:2 (1997) (stepparent owes duty of support to stepchild during marriage); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4C-2(b) (West
1999) (includes as child under neglect and dependency proceedings a stepchild); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 415 (1999);
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAw § 101 (1992) (stepparent liable for support of stepchild to prevent the same from becoming
a public charge); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4 (Supp. 1998) (any person standing in loco parentisto child has duty
of support); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-09 (1997) (extending stepparent support duty during the marriage and so
long thereafter as the stepchildren remain in the stepparent's family); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 15 (1998)
(stepparent has duty of support to stepchild); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.053 (Supp. 1998) (stepparent has duty of
support to stepchild); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-8 (1999) (a stepparent shall maintain his spouse's children born
prior to the marriage); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.1 (1997) (imposes support duty on stepparent that terminates
on divorce); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 296 (1989) (stepparent has duty of support of stepchild); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.16.205 (1997) (imposes duty of support on stepparent which shall cease on termination of relationship
between husband and wife).
32. See, e.g., Openshaw v. Openshaw, 639 P.2d 177, 179 (Utah 1981) (father entitled to reduction of child
support for natural child based on his new obligation to support his stepchild); Washington Statewide Org. of
Stepparents v. Smith, 536 P.2d 1202, 1208 (Wash. 1975) (statute is not a violation of equal protection by imposing
on stepparents the duty of support while not imposing on cohabitants the same duty, nor does statute impair
obligation of marriage contracts). See generally Patricia Jean Lamkin, J.D., Annotation, Validity, Construction,
and Application of Statute Imposing Upon StepparentObligationto Support Child, 75 A.L.R.3D 1129 (1977).
33. See ADELE STUART MERiAM, THE STEPFATHER INTHE FAMILY (1940) (tracing the doctrine of in loco
parentisin the United States to Williams v. Hutchinson, 5 Barb. 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 1849)).
34. Harris v. Lyon, 140 P. 825, 826 (Ariz. 1914); accord State v. Smith, 485 S.W.2d 461,467 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1972) (position stepparent assumes for himself determines if he stands in loco parentis, and if he voluntarily
receives child into family and treats it as a member thereof, he may be said to be standing in place of natural
parent); Schneider v. Schneider, 52 A.2d 564, 566 (N.J. Ch. 1947) (if stepfather voluntarily accepts into his family
a child of his wife by a former husband and assumes the obligations of a parent, such obligation continues as long
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As with all other equitable doctrines, the creation of an in loco parentis
relationship depends on the facts of the case. Generally, there must be an intent by
35 Most often, stepparents
the stepparent to create the status of in loco parentis.
establish de facto in loco parentis relationships with their stepchildren during the
course of the marriage of the child's custodial parent by residing in the same
household and treating the stepchild as a natural child. Treating a stepchild as one's
own includes taking responsibility for the child's care, education, and development,
including contributing to the child's support without the expectation of financial
compensation. 36 Because the establishment of an in loco parentis relationship is
dependent on the voluntary assumption of responsibility by the stepparent, the
relationship is terminable at the will of the stepparent.37 The relationship, and the
duty of support that goes with it, is therefore evanescent, able to be broken by the
stepparent without regard to the stepchild.
As with the case of subsequent born natural children, the duty to support a
stepchild will not be cause for downward modification of the prior born child's
support obligation. Most states do not consider stepchildren to be "children of a
subsequent marriage" in their child support guidelines.3" The duty to support
stepchildren is explicitly considered in the guidelines calculation in only four
states.39 Instead, most child support guidelines, and cases interpreting those
guidelines, have taken the position that a noncustodial parent who becomes

as he permits the child to be in his home). See, e.g., In re Teddy's Estate, 29 Cal. Rptr. 402, 405 (Cal. Ct. App.
1963); Ladd v. Welfare Comm'r, 217 A.2d 490, 492 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1965); Kelley v. Iowa Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
197 N.W.2d 192, 200 (Iowa 1972); Duffey v. Duffey, 438 S.E.2d 445, 447 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Palmer v.
Harrold, 656 N.E.2d 708,710 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Drescher v. Morgan, 251 S.W.2d 173, 174 (Tex. Civ. App.
1952).
35. See Dodd v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 991,995 (W.D. Ark. 1948); Jackson v. Jackson, 278 A.2d 114,
115 (D.C. 1971); Rutkowski v. Wasko, 143 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. App. Div. 1955); Appeal of Fowler, 288 A.2d 463,
465-66 (Vt. 1972) (assumption of parental relationship by stepparent is largely question of intention which should
not lightly or hastily be inferred); State ex rel Gilroy v. Superior Court for King County, 226 P.2d 882, 886 (Wash.
1951) (relationship of in locoparentisbecomes established only when a person intends to assume toward the child
the status of parent).
36. See, e.g., Deal v. Deal, 545 So. 2d 780,781-82 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989); Brummitt v. Commonwealth,
357 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Ky. 1962); Palmer v. Harrold, 656 N.E.2d 708, 709 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); In re Custody of
H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419,435 (Wis. 1995).
37. See Exparte Lipscomb, 660 So. 2d 986,988 (Ala. 1994), aff'd, 660 So. 2d 991 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995);
Franklin v. Franklin, 253 P.2d 337, 340 (Ariz. 1953); Jackson v. Jackson, 278 A.2d 114 (D.C. 1971); Cavanaugh
v. deBaudiniere, 493 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Neb. 1992); Falzo v. Falzo, 202 A.2d 192, 195 (N.J. App. Div. 1964).
38. See, e.g., AR. C.S.G., Appx. § 25-320 1 2(d) (Supp. 1998) (support of stepchildren is to be considered
strictly voluntary); JND. C.S.G., Guideline 3 (1999) (no adjustment for stepchildren); N.J. Rules Appx. IX-E(C)(5)
(1999) (stepchildren should not be considered when determining deduction); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 118(A)
(Supp. 1999) (court shall not take into account stepchildren); OR. ADMIN. R. 137-50-320(3) (1998) (specifically
excluded from definition of nonjoint child is stepchild); S.C. SOC. SERv. REG. 114-4720() (Supp. 1998) (additional
dependents do not include stepchildren). See also Haggard v. Haggard, 45 Cal. Rptr.2d 638, 639 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (no hardship deduction allowed for voluntary support of new wife's children); Mack v. Mack, 749 P.2d 478,
482 (Haw. Ct. App. 1988) (support of stepchild not basis for deviation); Donohue v. Getman, 432 N.W.2d 281,
282 (S.D. 1988) (deviation not justified by support for stepchildren). This is true even though these same states
may impose a statutory duty on the stepparent to support the stepchild.
39. See MiCH. CHILD SUPPORT FORMULA MANUAL IU(N) (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458-C:4(U)
(1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-7-6.10 (1999); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 656a(a) (Supp. 1998); see also
Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 574 A.2d 772,774 (Vt. 1990).
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responsible for supporting the children of a second marriage does so with the
knowledge of a continuing responsibility to the children of the prior marriage.'
Finally, it must be remembered that the duty to support a stepchild is at most a
secondary liability. It does not displace the primary duty of the father and mother
to support the child."
In sum, then, the duty to support a stepchild during the marriage is a secondary
liability that must be intentionally assumed. The in loco parentisrelationship on
which it depends can be terminated at will by the stepparent. 42
IV.

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION LAW: THE PENALTY FOR
SUPPORTING A PRIOR CHILD AND THE REWARD FOR
SUPPORTING A STEPCHILD
The law of division of property upon divorce provides, in the most general terms,
that upon divorce, the court may divide the marital estate between the parties as is
just and equitable.43
When a spouse conceals, conveys, or wastes marital assets in anticipation of
divorce, that spouse has "dissipated" marital assets. 44 The court may then treat the

40. See, e.g., Feltman v. Feltman, 434 N.W.2d 590, 591 (S.D. 1989); Harmon v. DSHS, 951 P.2d 770,
(Wash. 1998).
41. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-4.2 (1997) (the duty ofa stepparent to support a stepchild does not
relieve the natural parent of his or her duty of support). See also DeTavis v. Aragon, 727 P.2d 558,563 (N.M.
1986); Monroe County ex tel. Palermo v. Palermo, 596 N.Y.S.2d 252, 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993); Duffey v.
Duffey, 438 S.E.2d 445, 448-49 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Brandriet v. Larsen, 442 N.W.2d 455, 448 (N.D. 1989);
Commonwealth ex rel. Stack v. Stack, 15 A.2d 76, 79 (Pa. Super. 1940); Niesen v. Niesen, 157 N.W.2d 660, 662
(Wis. 1968).
42. In fact, one court has gone so far as to declare that a stepparent who has joint custody of a child after
a divorce still has no child support obligation. See Brinkerhoff v. Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d 113, 117 (Utah Ct. App.
1997).
43. The hallmark of the equitable distribution system is the court's authority to distribute between the
spouses, in equitable or just proportions and in accordance with the statutorily prescribed factors, property that is
subject to division as defined by the statute, regardless of which spouse acquired or has title to the property. See
Lewis Becker, Overview of Statutes Governing Property Distribution, in 1 VALUATION AND DISTIBUrION OF
MAUTAL PRoPERTY §§ 3.01-3.15 (John McCahey ed., 1990).
Among the equitable distribution states, the main distinguishing feature is whether the court may divide
all the property owned by the parties, or whether the court must classify the property as either separate or marital,
and may then divide marital property only. Dual classification states comprise Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. All property states comprise Alabama, Connecticut,
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Oregon, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming.
Community property states comprise Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, and Washington. In Arizona, Idaho, Nevada, Texas, and Washington, community property is divided
equitably, while in California, Louisiana, and New Mexico, it is divided equally.
44. While a comprehensive discussion of dissipation is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted
that a majority of cases have held that dissipation can occur only after there has been a breakdown of the marriage.
See Streb v. Streb, 774 P.2d 798, 802 (Alaska 1989); In re Marriage of O'Neill, 563 N.E.2d 494, 497 (Il. 1990);
Clements v. Clements, 397 S.E.2d 257,261 (Va. Ct. App. 1990); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(1 la) (Supp.
1999) (listing as a factor to be considered in making equitable distribution "[a]cts of either party... to waste,
neglect, devalue or convert the marital property... during the period after separation of the parties and before the
time of distribution"). Other cases focus on whether property has been intentionally removed from the marital estate
in order to defeat the other spouse's equitable distribution rights. See Robinette v. Robinette, 736 S.W.2d 351, 354
(Ky. Ct. App. 1987); Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 497 A.2d 485, cert. denied, 501 A.2d 845 (Md. Spec. Ct. App.
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dissipated marital assets as though they were part of the estate to be divided, and
award the dissipated assets to the guilty spouse as part of his or her share of the
marital estate.4 5 The obvious effect of awarding the guilty spouse assets that no
longer exist is to make an unequal division of the remaining nondissipated marital
estate.
The use of marital funds to pay nonmarital expenses or debts is generally
considered dissipation of marital assets. The most obvious example of dissipation
of marital funds for a nonmarital purpose is when one spouse uses marital funds to
pay for the expenses of a paramour.4 6 Another obvious example of dissipation of
marital funds to pay a nonmarital debt is when one spouse uses marital funds to pay
gambling debts.47
Instead of adding the marital funds back into the marital estate, some courts have
held that the use of marital funds to pay nonmarital expenses or debts is a negative

contribution to the marital estate.4" This negative contribution to the marital estate
again compels the court to make an unequal division of the remaining marital estate,
penalizing the "guilt " spouse by awarding that spouse less than he or she would
otherwise have been entitled.
The principle that marital funds spent on nonmarital debt should work to the

detriment of the spouse who spends the funds has, of late, compelled courts to hold
that the payment of child support during a marriage for a child born prior to the
marriage constitutes the payment of a nonmarital debts with marital funds, and thus

1985); Rundell v. Rundell, 423 N.W.2d 77 (Minn. CL App. 1988). Finally, a third class of cases focus on whether
a spouse spends marital funds on a "nonmarital purpose." See In re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 331 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1996); In re Marriage of Coyle, 671 N.E.2d 938, 943 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996); Dove v. Dove, 773 S.W.2d
871, 874 (Mo. CL App. 1989); Lenczycki v. Lenczycki, 543 N.Y.S.2d 724, 727 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). It should
also be noted that every "marital purpose" need not necessarily benefit each spouse. As stated in In re Marriage
of Coyle, "Mhe fact that one spouse or the marriage itself does not benefit directly from an expenditure does not,
standing alone, require a finding that a dissipation of marital assets has occured .... Each party to a marriage
typically spends some part of marital funds for his or her own purposes." 671 N.E.2d at 943.
What all of these theories of dissipation have in common is an attempt to compensate one spouse for
an intentional or grossly negligent depletion of the marital estate at the hands of the other spouse.
EQrrABLEDISRIBUIONOFPROPERTY § 6.30, at 473 (2d ed. 1994);
45. See generallyBRErrR.TURN
Lewis Becker, Conduct of a Spouse That DissipatesPropertyAvailablefor Equitable PropertyDistribution:A
Suggested Analysis, 52 OHIO ST. U. 95, 105-7 (1991).
46. See, e.g., Romano v. Romano, 632 So. 2d 207, 210 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); In re Marriage of
App. Ct. 1996); Brosick v. Brosick, 974 S.W.2d 498, 502 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998);
Charles, 672 N.E.2d 57, 61 (IlM.
Noll v. Noll, 375 S.E.2d 338 (S.C. CL App. 1988); Zieba v. Martin, 928 S.W.2d 782, 790 (Tex. App. 1996).
47. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Smith, 448 N.E.2d 545, 548 (1ll. App. Ct. 1989); Micha v. Micha, 624
N.Y.S.2d 465,466 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Grandovic v. Grandovic, 564 A.2d 960,963-64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
The fact that a debt is incurred before the marriage or after the date of classification does not necessarily
mean the payment of the debt is for a nonmarital purpose. The most obvious example of this is the payment of
student loans. See In re Marriage of Speirs, 956 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997); Simmons v. Simmons,
708 A.2d 949 (Conn. 1998); Roberts v. Roberts, 670 N.E.2d 72,76-77 (Ind. CL App. 1996); Tasker v. Tasker, 395
N.W.2d 100, 105 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Hicks v. Hicks, 969 S.W.2d 840, 846-47 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998); In re
Marriage of Lopez, 841 P.2d 1122, 1125-26 (Mont. 1992); Bourdon v. Bourdon, 403 A.2d 433, 434-35 (N.H.
1979); Forristall v.Forristall, 831 P.2d 1017, 1019-20 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992). These cases recognize that student
loans provide a benefit to both parties: the higher earning capacity of one party in the marital partnership.
48. See Adams v. Adams, 443 S.E.2d 780,781 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (use of marital funds to pay separate
debts is a distributional factor); Fenske v. Fenske, 542 N.W.2d 98, 102 (N.D. 1996) (stressing in division of marital
assets that husband's premarital debts had been paid off during the marriage with marital funds).
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either is considered dissipation of marital assets49 or a negative contribution to the
marital estate.50
The "dissipation of marital assets" theory was expounded in Jensen v. Jensen.5"
In that case, the husband came into the marriage with an obligation to support two
children from a prior marriage. During the marriage, he had another child by a
paramour, who successfully obtained a child support order against the husband. The
court held that payment of both support obligations from marital funds was
dissipation:
Wife did not benefit by allowing husband to liquidate marital assets for payment
of these "personal" obligations. It is difficult to conceive the benefit to wife
from husband's liquidation of marital assets in order to pay his ex-lover support
for the child the two conceived during his marriage to wife. Likewise, wife
received no benefit from money expended to pay husband's obligation for child
support to husband's ex-wife.... The trial court did not err in setting apart
assets, some of which had already been liquidated, as a portion of husband's
marital property award. They were marital assets utilized by husband to fulfill
his obligations.52
The court thus classified payment of child support to children of a previous
marriage, and to a child born out-of-wedlock during the marriage as dissipation of
marital assets.
The latest example of the "negative contribution" theory may be found in Barker
v. Barker.5 3 In that case, the court stated,
In dual classification states such as Virginia, the use of marital funds for
nonmarital purposes can be considered as a factor in determining an equitable
distribution award. For example, where marital funds are used to pay the
separate debts of one of the parties, a court may properly consider that fact as
a negative monetary contribution to the marital property. In addition, we have
found that support obligations arising from a prior marriage may constitute such
a separate debt.
Based on Virginia's statutory scheme and the cases which have applied it, we
hold that the trial court could properly consider husband's use of marital funds
to pay his prior support obligations as a negative monetary contribution in
fashioning its equitable distribution award.'

49. See Jensen v. Jensen, 877 S.W.2d 131, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
50. See McGee v. McGee, 648 A.2d 1128, 1133-34 (N.J. App. Div. 1994); Barker v. Barker, 500 S.E.2d
240, 249-250 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (over strong dissent); see also Bliss v. Bliss, 898 P.2d 1081, 1083-84 (Idaho
1995) (husband's use of marital funds to pay attorney's fees and judgment from prior divorce did not meet
requirements of community property); cf Dobbyn v. Dobbyn, 471 A.2d 1068, 1078 (Md. Spec. Ct. App. 1984)
(holding consideration of husband's new support obligations for children of new marriage and awarding husband
greater portion of marital estate on that basis was not error).
Texas has consistently held otherwise. See Hunt v. Hunt, 952 S.W.2d 564, 568-69 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997)
(child and spousal support); Pelzig v. Berkebile, 931 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996); Zieba v. Martin, 928
S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
51. 877 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
52. Id. at 135.
53. 500 S.E.2d 240 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
54. Id. at 249; see also Hayes v. Hayes, 465 S.E.2d 590, 592 (Va. Ct. App. 1996) (support obligation to
prior family is nonmarital debt).
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The New Jersey case of McGee v. McGee"5 was no less harsh:
Moreover, while the judge may have been correct in his conclusion that Dr.
McGee did not "dissipate" assets, he appears to have given no consideration at
all of the payment of a small fortune by Dr. McGee toward his pre-existing
obligations to his former wife and children. Mrs. McGee was not required to
contribute her assets toward that support and this is an equitable consideration
applicable to distribution. 6
The effect of Jensen, Barker, and McGee is that in a divorce action, a spouse who
has paid support for a child of a prior marriage or relationship is penalized in the
property division aspect of the proceeding, while at the same time that same support
obligation is given priority as a matter of public policy when the support obligation
is calculated for the children of the marriage.
Clearly bothered by the prospect of finding that the support of a child from a
prior marriage or relationship constitutes dissipation of marital funds or a negative
contribution to the marital estate, two courts have held that the nonobligor spouse
"consented" to the expenditure of marital funds on the nonmarital purpose, and thus
the expenditure was neither dissipation nor a negative contribution. 7
In contrast to the courts' treatment of the use of marital funds for the payment of
child support for prior born children is the courts' treatment of the use of marital
funds for the support of a stepchild. In this case, the stepparent is viewed as making
a positive contribution to the marriage, and is rewarded for that contribution.
The leading case nationwide which espouses this principle is Fuerstv. Fuerst.5"
Fuerstheld that such support falls within the general rule that contributions to child
care are relevant to property division:
Support of a spouse's children is a factor similar in economic and equitable
considerations to sec. 767.255(3). Section 767.255(3) indicates that the
legislature considers homemaking and child care services to be relevant
considerations in dividing property. The economic equivalent of such services
would be equally relevant.
The consideration of economic and equitable factors related to homemaking
and child care is consistent with the legislative statement of purpose in ch 105,
sec 1, Laws of 1977, which states, in relevant part:
(2) It is the intent of the legislature that a spouse who has been handicapped
socially or economically by his or her contributions to a marriage shall be
compensated for such contributions at the termination of the marriage ....
The factor considered in this case is an "economic" issue involved in the
marital relationship. Lawrence did sustain an economic handicap by his
contributions to Bernice's children, while Bernice was benefitted economically
by not having to pursue alternate sources of support.5 9

55. 648 A.2d 1128 (N.J. App. Div. 1994).
56. d at 1134-35.
57. See Rosenfield v. Rosenfield, 597 So. 2d 835, 837 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1992); In re Marriage of Burgess,
568 N.W.2d 827, 828 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997).
58. 286 N.W.2d 861 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
59. Id. at 866.
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The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
considering support for stepchildren as a division factor.
Alaska has also held that the prior contributions to the support of a stepchild are
a division factor. In Burgess v. Burgess,'"the court held:
The trial court found that Larry supported Carole's two children from her
previous marriage and one of her grandchildren. Carole argues that the trial
court abused its discretion in considering such support in dividing the property.
At common law, a stepparent-stepchild relationship imposes no obligations and
confers no benefits on either the stepparents or the child. Since a stepparent
need not support a stepchild, and such support provided must be presented to be
a gift. ...
We are unable to say that the division in this case was made unjust by
the court's consideration of Larry's contribution to the support of Carole's
children.6 1
It is the rare case that has held it is error to attach any weight to contributions for
the support of stepchildren. In Robinson v. Robinson,62 the court summarily held:
[Tihe voluntary support of a spouse's child during marriage is perhaps a
generous gift at the time it occurs, but it has no bearing on how the marital
property should be distributed between the two spouses at divorce (except as it
affects their economic circumstances at the time).63
Similarly, in In re Marriageof Schultz,' the court reversed a trial court decision
which considered support of stepchildren as a division factor in equitable
distribution. The court expressly relied upon two Montana statutes. The first statute
provided that where a stepparent supports stepchildren, "it
is presumed that he does
so as a parent." 65 The second statute provided that one parent is not obligated to
reimburse the other for contributions to the support of their children unless there is
a specific contrary agreement. 66 The court reasoned that because support was
provided, the stepparent was acting as a parent, and since no agreement was proven,
the trial court's order effectively awarded reimbursement in violation of the second
67
statute.
In sum, at the division stage of the equitable distribution case, a support obligor's
payment of support to prior born children is considered dissipation of marital funds
or a negative contribution to the marital estate, while a stepparent's contributions
of support to a stepchild is considered a positive factor.

60. 710 P.2d 417 (Alaska 1985).
61. Id. at 422; see also Cox v. Cox, 882 P.2d 909, 920 (Alaska 1994) (holding that it is an abuse of

discretion not to consider stepparent's contributions in making equitable distribution award); cf Burcell v. Burcell,
713 P.2d 802, 805 (Alaska 1986) (agreeing that stepparent's contribution to support can be positive factor in
equitable distribution, but reversing on facts, holding there was insufficient evidence of such contribution);
Schwegler v. Schwegler, 417 N.W.2d 420,431 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that a court may, but is not required
to, consider contributions of stepparent in equitable distribution award).
62. 554 A.2d 1173 (Me. 1979).
63. Id. at 1175.
64. 597 P.2d 1174 (Mont. 1979).
65. Id. at 1176 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. §61-117 (1947)).
66. See id.
67. See id. at 1177.
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A CALL TO CHANGE: INCOME TO SUPPORT A PRIOR BORN CHILD
IS NOT "MARITAL FUNDS" AND THUS CANNOT BE DISSIPATED
It is black letter law in all states that the financial aspects of the divorce should
fit together "like a carefully crafted mosaic":' spousal support must be determined
in light of the equitable distribution award and the child support award, the
equitable distribution award must be determined in light of the spousal support
award and the child support award, and the child support award can consider the
spousal support and property division provisions of the divorce. 9 For this reason,
when on appeal one aspect of the financial award is overturned, all aspects of the
case are remanded to the trial court for redetermination.7 It seems obvious,
however, that the law of child support and the law of equitable distribution are
severely at odds when it comes to equitable distribution and the support of prior
children. Child support law demands, as a matter of public policy, that child support
obligations to prior born children be complied with in a timely manner. Yet, the law
of property division effectively penalizes the parent who fulfills this obligation in
a timely and responsible manner.7 Child support law also regards the stepparent's
duty to support a stepchild as only a secondary duty behind that of the natural
parent, and dependent on the equitable doctrine of in loco parentis.Yet, the law of
property division rewards the stepparent who uses marital funds to fulfill this
ephemeral duty.
The law of equitable distribution should align itself with the law of child support
by viewing the income that a support obligor earns in order to pay a child support
obligation for a prior born child as neither marital funds nor separate funds, but
funds earnedand held in trustfor the child.
V.

68. See Michel v. Michel, 624 A.2d 914,915 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
69. See TURNER, supra note 45, § 8.08, at 596-7.
70. See, e.g., Byrd v. Byrd, 674 So. 2d 585 (Ala: Civ. App. 1995) (on determination on appeal that wife
*should have been awarded portion of husband's retirement benefits as part of property award, trial court was
instructed to revisit alimony award as well); Tortorich v. Tortorich, 902 S.W.2d 247, 251 (Ark. Ct. App. 1995)
(remanding on issue of valuation of husband's professional association, order concerning payment of expert's fees
and alimony also must be reconsidered); In re Marriage of Simon, 856 P.2d 47, 51-52 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding that reversal of order for property division required that issues of maintenance and attorney fees be
reconsidered as well); Grosch v. Grosch, 665 A.2d 918, 919-20 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that disruption of
one element of financial orders necessarily places in doubt propriety of other orders in entire distribution scheme);
Collinsworth v. Collinsworth, 624 So. 2d 287, 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (requiring that award of alimony be
reconsidered where district court of appeal vacated entire plan of equitable distribution); In re Marriage of Brenner,
601 N.E.2d 1270, 1276 (Il. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that if trial court is to reexamine division of marital assets,
it should also examine the effect of its new division on maintenance and attorney fees); In re Marriage of Mayfield,
477 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991) (holding that where improper division of property required remand,
remand was also required as to alimony); Freese v. Freese, 597 A.2d 1007, 1012 (Md. Spec. Ct. App. 1991)
(requiring that alimony award be reconsidered in light of remand of equitable monetary award); In re Marriage of
Strassner, 895 S.W.2d 614, 617 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that to the extent that maintenance award and
pension distribution award are interdependent, if pension distribution is changed on appeal, maintenance must be
revisited); Madori v. Madori, 608 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding that distribution of marital
property is part of interrelated whole, which requires consideration of alimony and child support); Spychalski v.
Spychalski, 608 N.E.2d 802, 809 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (holding that since division of marital property was
reversed, issue of alimony may have to be redetermined as well); Kanta v. Kanta, 479 N.W.2d 505, 511 (S.D. 1991)
(determining that court's award of alimony would have to be revisited where property division was remanded).
71. Cf. Miles v. Werle, 977 S.W.2d 297 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (husband dissipated marital assets when wife
had to bail husband out of jail for failing to pay child support).
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This view of income earned by a support obligor would be wholly consistent with
recent federal legislation contained in the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act' (PRWORA) of 1996 concerning the enforcement
of child support.
First, by way of background to the child support related provisions of PRWORA,
the Bradley Amendment to the Family Support Act of 1988"3 provides that one
requirement for a state's receipt of federal funds for child support enforcement is
that the courts cannot retroactively modify a child support obligation: once the
obligation becomes due and owing, it is a judgment.
Under the recent amendments to 42 U.S.C. § 666 enacted by PRWORA, any
support obligation will automatically become subject to an income withholding
order if it is past due.74 Further, at the time the initial order is entered, the obligor
may request an income withholding order, and income is not subject to withholding
only if the tribunal finds good cause not to require immediate income withholding. 75
In the context of interstate enforcement, the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
(UIFSA) provides that any person may send an income withholding order to an
obligor's employer.76 Since 85% of Americans who file income tax returns report
receiving some or all of their income by way of salary or wage, an income
withholding order is applicable to most child support obligors.77
PRWORA also provides that as a condition of receiving federal funds, the states
must adopt laws providing that liens arise by operation of law for past due support.78
Consequently, a child support enforcement agency can issue a lien based on any
child support obligation, and the lien can then be used as the basis for tax refund
offsets, license revocation, levy and seizure of bank accounts, and seizure of
government benefits, lottery winnings and other assets not otherwise exempt by law.
The effect of these federal statutes relating to child support enforcement is that
as each child support obligation becomes due and owing from month to month, and
in some states from week to week, it is subject to wage withholding, levy, seizure,
and other enforcement procedures as a matter of law, without further order of the
court. The child support obligor, therefore, earns his or her income in order to pay
the outstanding order. Under this view, it is sensible to call the funds earned for the
payment of support and subject to withholding and liens not "marital funds" but
funds held specifically for payment of the child support obligation. In essence, the
support obligor holds his or her income in trust for the benefit of the child.7 9

72. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, P.L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (also
known as the "welfare Reform Act"). See generally Samuel V. Schoonmaker IV, Consequences and Validity of
Family Law Provisionsin the "Welfare Reform Act," 14 J. AM. ACAD. MATIuM. LAW. 1 (1997); Paul K. Legler,
The ComingRevolution in Child Support Policy: Implicationsof the 1996 Welfare Act, 30 FAM. L.Q. 519 (1996).
73. 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)(C) (Supp. 1999).
74. See id. § 666(a)(1)(B).
75. See id. § 666(a)(8)(B)(i) & (b)(3)(A).
76. See UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT § 501(a), 9 I U.LA. 410 (Supp. 1999).
77. See U.S. COMMISSION ON INTERSTATE CHILD SUPPORT, SUPPORTING OUR CHILDREN: A BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM 148 (1994).
78. See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(4)(A); Marilyn Ray Smith, Child Support Enforcement Through Lien, Levy,
and Seizure by the Departmentof Revenue, Massachusetts Bar Association (June 1992).
79. The "trust"
aspect of the child support obligation is made crystal clear in pending federal legislation.
HR 2855 was introduced to further amend the Social Security Act to require that anticipated child support be held
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This view of income earned by a support obligor would also be wholly consistent
with the view of many states that child support received by the child support obligee
is held by the custodial parent in a fiduciary capacity for the child."0 For this reason,
in most states the parents cannot privately agree to waive the payment of child
support in the future,"1 and in many states, the courts have held that the custodial

parent cannot enter into an agreement with the noncustodial parent to forgive

arrears; such would be a breach of the fiduciary duty. 2 The fiduciary duty of the
custodial parent with regards to the receipt of child support also imposes on the
custodial parent the duty to account to the noncustodial parent for the expenditure
of child support in some states. 3 Morevoer, all child support guidelines exclude
from the definition of income child support received for the benefit of a child of
another marriage."s Clearly, then, if the child support received by the obligee is held
by the obligee as fiduciary, then it is paid by the obligor as a fiduciary as well, and
should not be considered as part of the marital assets.
This view that income earned and held to pay a child support obligation is not
marital property is superior to the fiction that a spouse "consents" to the payment
of child support for a child of a previous relationship at the commencement of the
marriage." For example, what if during the marriage a husband is sued for paternity

in trust upon the sale or financing of certain real property of an obligated parent.
80. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Jenkins, 567 N.E.2d 136, 140 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Varner v. Varner, 588 So. 2d
428, 432 (Miss. 1991); Office of Tony Ctr. v. Baker, 366 S.E.2d 167, 168 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that
attorney's charging lien does not attach to child support payments because those payments are received and held
by the custodial parent as a "trustee" for the child, and as a trustee the parent lacks sufficient ownership in the child
support payments to grant a lien against the payments); Sue Davidson, P.C. v. Naranjo, 904 P.2d 354, 356 (Wyo.
1995) (same).
81. See, e.g., State ex rel. Shellhouse v. Bentley, 666 So. 2d 517 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995); Smith v. Saxon,
918 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Ariz. CL App. 1996); Lusby v. Lusby, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); State
Dep't of Revenue v. Ortega, 682 So. 2d 589, 590 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1996); Haddon v. Dep't of Human Resources,
469 S.E.2d 434,436 (Ga. 1996); Blisset v. Blisset, 526 N.E.2d 125, 128 (IM1.1988); Straub v. B.M.T., 645 N.E.2d
597, 599 (Ind. 1994); In re Marriage of Sundholm, 448 N.W.2d 688, 690 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989); Evink v. Evink,
542 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); Loscheider v. Loscheider, 563 N.W.2d 331, 334 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997); Boland v. State Dep't of Soc. Servs., 910 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Monmouth City Div. of
Soc. Servs. v. G.D.M., 705 A.2d 408, 411 (N.J. Ch. Div.1997); Dox v. Tyson, 681 N.E.2d 398, 402 (App. Div.
1996); Witt v. Witt, 929 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tenn. CL App. 1996); Kelley v. Kelley, 449 S.E.2d 55, 56 (Va. 1994);
Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L, 459 S.E.2d 415, 418 (W. Va. 1995).
82. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Edge, 128 S.E.2d 493, 495 (Ga. 1962); McCormick v. Collard, 10 N.E.2d 742,
743 (Ind. Ct. App. 1937); Hart v. Hart, 539 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Ruehle v. Ruehle, 74 N.W.2d
689, 694 (Neb. 1956); Dinnar v. Ditmar, 293 P.2d 759 (Wash. 1956); Kimble v. Kimble, 341 S.E.2d 420, 424 (W.
Va. 1986). See generally,Kristine Cordier Kamezis, Annotation, Validity and Effect, as Between FormerSpouses,
ofAgreement Releasing Parentfrom Payment of Child SupportProvidedfor in an EarlierDivorce Decree § 4,
100 A.L.R.3D 1129,1139-1153 (1980).
83. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-115(3)(b)(II) (1999); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 13, § 518 (1994); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 61.13(1)(a) (Supp. 1999); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-16-9-6 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(0
(1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:3112 (Supp. 1999); Mo. REv. STAT. § 454.342 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42364 (6) (Supp. 1998); NJ. Rules, Appx. IX-A (1999); NJ. REv. STAT. § 107.105(1)(c) (Supp. 1998); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.23.050(2Xa)(ii) (Supp. 1999); see also Wilson v. Wilson, 464 So. 2d 496, 498 (Miss. 1985)
(holding that only child has right to accounting, for the custodial parent's assertion of the child's right of child
support is not by virtue of the parent's legal right to those funds, but by virtue of the fiduciary relationship owed
to the child). But see Fletcher v. Cole, 690 So. 2d 444, 446 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (holding that a custodial parent
is generally not required to account for the child support expended for the support of the child).
84. See, e.g., Shaddox v. Schoenberger, 869 P.2d 249,253 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994). See generallyMORGAN,
supra note 23, § 2.03f, at 2-51.
85. See Wright v. Wright, 904 P.2d 403,409 (Alaska 1995) ($143,000 gift to children was not dissipation,

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

for a child that was born prior to the marriage, and of whom the husband had no
knowledge? Clearly, the wife did not "consent" at the time of the marriage to the
entry of an order finding the husband liable for child support for a then unknown
child whose existence was discovered after the marriage. Nonetheless, in this
situation, in the realm of child support law, the husband's payment of child support
from current income, i.e., marital funds, is payment for child support of a child born
prior to the marriage, and thus is entitled to absolute judicial deference if and when
the husband becomes liable for children of the new marriage. At the same time, the
courts would regard this payment of child support as dissipation of marital assets.
The only solution is to regard the funds earned for the benefit of the prior born child
as funds held in trust for the child by the support obligor.
A public policy exception may be made for a child born as the result of an extramarital affair.8 6 In this regard, the analogy can aptly be drawn to the principle that
funds spent on a paramour constitutes dissipation. 7 The dissipating spouse,
however, should not suffer so great a penalty in the equitable distribution phase of
the divorce that he or she is left without adequate means to support the out of
wedlock child.
VI. CONCLUSION
The law of equitable distribution and the law of child support, especially the
public policy of support enforcement espoused by the federal government, should
not work in opposition. In order for the courts to apply the law consistently, the
expenditure of funds on child support should not be considered dissipation of
marital assets or a negative contribution to the marital estate. Rather, the income
earned for the payment of child support should be considered outside the marital
estate.

where nondonor spouse consented to gift); Askinazi v. Askinazi, 641 A.2d 413, 416 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994)
(husband's gambling losses were not dissipation when wife consented to and shared in husband's winnings); St.
Laurent v. St. Laurent. 583 A.2d 211, 212 (Me. 1990) (parties' support of son and his girlfriend was not for
nonmarital purpose, where both parties consented to such support); In re Aud, 491 N.E.2d 894, 901 (M. App. Ct.
1986) (spouse's support of widowed mother was not dissipation, where such support had been supplied regularly
through marriage). But see In re Lee. 615 N.E.2d 1314, 1320 (hi. App. Ct. 1993) (prior history of giving each child
$10,000 per year did not justify post-separation gift of $267,000).
86. See Jensen v. Jensen, 877 S.W.2d 131, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
87. See supra footnote 46 and accompanying text.

